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Abstract
This Article seeks to elaborate on various responses to challenges to the rule of law. The
authors consider certain of the greatest of these challenges to center around illegitimate control
of State organs by groups capable of infringing presumptive rights granted under treaty to States
that in a systematic and continuous way resort to abuse of process. This Article, dealing with the
equality of arms, is therefore only the first of a series exploring both this problem and the manner
in which it may be addressed. This Article assesses whether and to what extent State cooperation,
both before international tribunals as well as within the system of mutual assistance in criminal
matters, is vulnerable to these motives of realpolitik, while at the same time examining its impact
on the principle of equality of arms.
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INTRODUCTION
This is the first of a series of articles seeking to elaborate
responses to challenges to the rule of law. The authors consider
certain of the greatest of these challenges to center around illegitimate control of State organs by groups capable of infringing
presumptive rights granted under treaty to States that in a systematic and continuous way resort to abuse of process. This Article, dealing with the equality of arms, is therefore only the first
of a series exploring both this problem and the manner in which
it may be addressed. Whether this concept is dealt with under
the theoretical template of the "Dual State" in Europe, or what
we have called "State capture" in Latin America, the challenges
for defense lawyers will only be heightened in coming years.
I. THE DUAL STATE AS A NEW CHALLENGE OF STATE
COOPERATION WITHIN INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
During the last decade, several international criminal tribunals were established, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR").' In July 2002, the permanent International Criminal Court ("ICC") in the Hague be* Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, Professor of International Criminal Law (Utrecht
University), defense counsel before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"); lawyer at Knoops & Partners, Amsterdam, the
Netherlands; and Robert R. Amsterdam, International Defense Counsel, Toronto, Canada. While assuming full responsibility for the ideas expressed herein, the authors
wish to acknowledge that the applicability of Ernest Fraenkel's theory of the "Dual
State" to modern Russia was first identified by David Dyzenhaus, who, in discussions,
referred the authors to the Fraenkel text.
1. Security Council Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 21, S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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came operative. 2 In 2002, another category of tribunals also
came into existence: The so-called mixed, hybrid, or internationalized criminal courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra
Leone ("SCSL" or "Special Court"). The latter category of tribunals consists of national and international judges who administer
justice based on rules of procedure, which themselves are a mixture of national and international procedural rules. Within the
proceedings before all these types of tribunals, two procedural
pillars are of perennial concern and importance.
The first procedural pillar is the element of State cooperation, without which international criminal proceedings cannot
effectively function, seen from the perspectives of both the prosecution and the defense.4 The second procedural pillar is an
effective enforcement of the principle of equality of arms, which
is decisive for the administration of fair proceedings. 5 It can be
said that without the first pillar, State cooperation, the international tribunals can de facto not function. The same goes for
the endorsement of the principle of equality of arms. Consequently, that principle should have self-executing effect on the
first pillar: State cooperation. In the absence of such self-executing effect, State cooperation cannot proceed in a fair manner; and, thus, fair trials before these tribunals are jeopardized.
This Article focuses on the interrelation between State cooperation and equality of arms as basic pillars of international
criminal proceedings. This interaction is analyzed from the perspective of its importance for the effectiveness of the practice of
international criminal proceedings. State cooperation before international tribunals, in which procedural equity is fully guaranteed, seems an almost unachievable aim since, as a function of
their sovereignty, States apply a form of selectivity thereto. It can
be questioned whether such a form of duality indeed occurs
within the practice of international tribunals dealing with mat2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 126, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (noting that the Statute "shall enter into force
on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the
60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations").
3. For an overview of these tribunals, see GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNooPs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 13-20 (M. Cherif Bessiouni ed., 2003).
4. See id. at 1.

5. See id. at 120-21.
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ters of State responsibility. The same goes for national criminal
proceedings regarding evidence obtained through State cooperation, such as mutual assistance in criminal matters. In other
words, it could be questioned whether State cooperation on
both the international and national levels is nothing more than
a reflection of the phenomenon of the so-called "Dual State," a
concept that was developed by Ernst Fraenkel. 6
Ernst Fraenkel was a German political theorist who immigrated to the United States in 1939. In 1941, he published The
Dual State, in which he describes the coexistence of legalism with
an illiberal political regime in Nazi Germany. 7 Fraenkel portrays
the political system in Nazi Germany as a combination of the
"Normative State," defined as a rational State governed according to clearly elaborated legal norms, and the "Prerogative
State," defined as a State which exercised power arbitrarily, unchecked by law.' The entire legal system was prone to exploitation as an instrument at the disposal of the political authorities,
even though "insofar as the political authorities do not exercise
their power, private and public life are regulated either by the
traditionally prevailing or newly enacted law." 9 The Normative
State was to be sustained as a precondition for economic stability, while the coexistence of the Prerogative State preserved the
capacity to eliminate or neutralize enemies and perceived
threats.10 Fraenkel notes the growing friction throughout the
1930s between proponents of the Normative State and proponents of increased authoritarianism. 1
Fraenkel's analysis of the Dual State also describes how the
Prerogative State stifled public opinion. The insidious side of
the Dual State "thrives by veiling its true face,' 2 and, therefore,
public discussion must be reined in. Fraenkel refers to the
records of judicial proceedings to demonstrate the creeping
dominance of the Prerogative State. 3 His analysis shows that
the courts were responsible for assuring the maintenance of
6. See generally ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A
(E.A. Shils et al. trans., 1941).
7. See id. at 3-103, 107-49.
8. See id. at 46-49.
9. Id. at 57.
10. See id. at 171-87.
11. See id. at 65-101.
12. Id. at xvi.
13. See id. at 241-44.
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"capitalist order," even though the Prerogative State occasionally
exercised its ability to deal with specific cases in the interest of
expediently achieving its aims. The Prerogative State accepted
that the courts were necessary to assure entrepreneurial liberty,
the sanctity of contracts, private property rights, and competition; but this did not mean that the courts or the law were inviolable.' 4 Indeed, according to Fraenkel, the abolition of the inviolability of law was the chief characteristic of the Prerogative
State. 15
Clearly, there are limits to the application of Fraenkel's theory of the Dual State to modern States: The goals of the Prerogative State in the Third Reich were uniquely horrific. This theory retains value, however, when applied to modern States, and,
more relevant for the present analysis, when applied to issues of
State cooperation. Although State cooperation is governed by
legal rules, this same cooperation can also be used by political
authorities as an instrument to influence the underlying legal
system.
Transposed to the subject of State cooperation, the concept
of the Dual State implies that, despite the normative value and
safeguards of certain legal mechanisms in terms of checks and
balances, the entire legal system can become or de facto function as an instrument at the disposal of the political authorities.
Seen from this legal-philosophical perspective, the issue of State
cooperation is subject to realpolitik and can serve political authorities to influence the outcome of international criminal trials.
This Article assesses whether and to what extent State cooperation, both before international tribunals as well as within the
system of mutual assistance in criminal matters, is vulnerable to
these motives of realpolitik, while at the same time examining its
impact on the principle of equality of arms.
II. TWO MODELS OF STATE COOPERATION WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Before addressing the interplay between State cooperation
and equality of arms, it is important to observe that State cooperation within international criminal proceedings is based on a
horizontal model. This model assumes that legal assistance be14. See id. at 25.
15. See id. at 24.
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tween States takes place based on the idea that States as entities
are equal, and that legal communication and assistance in criminal cases are consensus-based. In other words, particular legal
aid actions, such as the rendition of people or providing evidence from one State to another, can be performed only after
consent of States. 6 Applying this model to international criminal tribunals implies that these tribunals are not empowered to
force sovereign States to provide legal assistance for particular
procedures at these tribunals.1 7
Contrary to this horizontal model, the vertical model assumes that international criminal tribunals have a supra-national
position authorizing them to force States to cooperate. This includes the power to issue so-called "binding orders" against
States, even when this goes against considerations of State sovereignty." The ICTY and ICTR are clearly based on a vertical
model of State cooperation. 9 Conversely, the ICC is distinguished by a system of State cooperation with characteristics of
both horizontal and vertical models.2 0 This is because the ICC is
based on a multilateral treaty that has been ratified by over one
hundred States.2 1 State cooperation, which, at this level, is based

on the so-called vertical model, appears essential to the functioning of ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, from the perspectives of both the
prosecutor and the defense.
III. THE MEANING AND SCOPE OFEQUALITY OF ARMS FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Before addressing the above mentioned fundamental questions, it is important to look at the meaning and scope of equality of arms within the procedures before these international
tribunals.
16. For a description of this model and its characteristics, see
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw
ORY AND

356 (2003); see also

PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL

AND

ANTONIO CASSESE,

GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER

INTERNATIONALIZED

KNooPs,

THE-

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

309-14 (Deirdre Curtain ed., 2005).
17. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 356.
18. See id.
19. The foundations of the ICTY and ICTR lie in a Chapter VII Resolution of the
United Nations. ICTR Statute, supra note 1; ICTY Statute, supra note 1.
20. CASSESE, supra note 16, at 356.
21. See UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. XVIII § 10, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVll/treaty 1 .asp.
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The essence of the principle of equality of arms, especially
as developed by the European Court for Human Rights ("European Court"), is that a suspect must not be placed in a procedurally disadvantaged position compared to the position of the prosecutor.2 2 The European Court's interpretation of this principle
is that equality should be guaranteed for both parties, prosecution as well as defense. 23 The international criminal tribunals
have adopted the same interpretation. 24 As in the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), the principle of equality of arms is not explicitly dealt with in the Tribunals' statutes,
but follows from the implementation of the notion of "fair
trial."25
What is the practical meaning of this principle in the trial
procedures of all these international criminal tribunals? There
are two particular instances where equality of arms has an important role in this context. The first concerns access to evidence
that, according to the prosecutor, forms the basis for the charge,
the so-called "discovery" process. Such evidence can contain
both exculpatory and inculpatory elements, and is necessary for
an adequate preparation of the defense case. The second concerns hearing witnesses during the trial under similar conditions
as the prosecutor, if necessary, by the tribunal issuing a subpoena to the particular witness involved, the so-called subpoena
ad testificandum.26
Based upon the practice before international and internationalized criminal courts, seen from the perspective of the defense, there appears to be a tension between these two aspects.
This tension may affect an effective preparation and presentation of a defense case before international criminal tribunals.
This issue is dealt with in the following section.

22. See Lizarraga v. Spain, App. No. 62543/00, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R (2004).
23. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 395-96; KNooPs, supra note 3, at 125-26.
24. See KNoops, supra note 3, at 125-26.
25. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 17, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; Rome Statute, supra
note 2, art. 67; ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 20; ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Decision on Defence
Motion to Summon Witnesses (Oct. 6, 1998) (quoting Rule 54).
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IV. EQUALITY OFPROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE WITH
RESPECT TO EQUALITY OF ARMS: THE
POSITION OF ICTY AD ICTR
Before addressing the question of whether there is de facto
such a thing as equality between the position of defense and
prosecution with respect to State cooperation, three important
judgments by the ICTY and ICTR concerning the interpretation
of "equality of arms" merit attention.2 7
The first relevant decision is the ICTR's May 5, 1997 order
in Prosecutorv. Kayishema/Ruzindana.2 s This order was rendered
in response to a request by the defense to the ICTR judges to
order the prosecution, based on the principle of equality of
arms, "to divulge and limit its number of lawyers, consultants,
assistants and investigators working on the case," and to explain
"the time spent and resources available to the Prosecution, since
the opening of the Kayishema file."2 9 The ICTRjudges rejected
this request, holding:
[T] he rights of the accused and equality between the parties
should not be confused with the equality of means and resources;
. . . the rights of the accused as laid down in Article 20 and in

particular (2) and (4) (b) of the Statute shall in no way be
interpreted to mean that the Defence is entitled to [the]
same means and resources as [are] available to the Prosecution;
...

the Defence Counsel has not proved to [this Tribunal's]

satisfaction any violation of the rights of the accused as laid
down in Article 20(2) and (4) (b).30
The Trial Chamber added that the Directive on the Assignment
of Defense Counsel explains extensively which financial means
are available to the defense, and the suspect in this case was unable to show that these financial means were not provided."1
27. See generally Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The Dichotomy between JudicialEconomy
and Equality of Arms within Internationaland Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defense
Perspective, 28 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1566 (2006).
28. Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Order on the Motion by the Defence Counsel for Application of Article 20(2) and (4) (b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (May 5, 1997).
29. Id. 5.
30. Id. 11 18-20.
31. See id. 21. Reference was made to Article 17 (a) of the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel that stipulates that costs for legal aid which are reasona-
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The second decision relevant in this respect is the ICTY February 4, 1998 decision in the case of Prosecutorv. Delalic.3 2 Prior
to this decision, Judge Lal C. Vohrah rendered a so-called separate opinion on November 27, 1996 in the first ICTY case, the
case against Dusko Tadic. In the separate opinion, Judge
Vohrah opined that the principle of equality of arms is primarily
and fundamentally meant to work in favor of a suspect's procedural rights.3 3 Judge Vohrah wrote:
It seems to me from the above authorities that the application
of the equality of arms principle especially in criminal proceedings should be inclined in favour of the Defence acquiring parity with the Prosecution in the presentation of the Defence case before the Court to preclude any injustice against
the accused.3 4
In Delalic, the ICTY Trial Chamber rejected Judge Vohrah's
interpretation for the following reason:
[T]here is no doubt that procedural equality means what it
says, equality between the Prosecution and the Defence. To
suggest, as has been done in the above quotation, an inclination in favour of the Defence is tantamount to a procedural
inequality in favour of the Defence and against the Prosecution, and will result in inequality of arms. This will be inconsistent with the minimum guarantee provided for in Article
21 para. 4(e) of the Statute. In the circumstances of the International tribunal, the Prosecutor and the Defence rely on
State cooperation for their investigation, so prima facie, the
basis for the inequality argument does not arise.35
Based on this consideration, the trial chamber ordered the defense to provide the prosecutors with a list of defense witnesses
prior to the trial.
The third relevant decision is the ICTY Appeals Chamber
ble and functional for the accused will be reimbursed by the tribunal. ICTR Directive
on the Assignment of Defence Counsel art. 17(a), Jan. 9, 1996.
32. Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for an Order Requiring
Advanced Disclosure of Witnesses by the Defence (Feb. 4, 1998).
33. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Separate Opinion ofJudge Vohrah
on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements,
12 (Nov. 27,
1996).
34. Id. 8.
35. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Prosecution's Motion
for an Order Requiring Advanced Disclosure of Witnesses by the Defense, 49 (Feb. 4
1998).
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decision of February 16, 1999 in the case of Prosecutor v. Aleksovki.

6

In this decision, the ICTY held that the principle of

equality of arms should be explained in favor of both parties in
the procedure and not merely in favor of the defendant.3 7
In sum, it could be argued that the ICTY and the ICTR see
the principle of equality of arms as a notion in favor of both
parties. The question arises as to whether this interpretation is
justified in light of current experiences of defense counsel acting before these international criminal tribunals.3" There, the
defense clearly operates from a procedurally disadvantaged position.39 In line with this, one could argue that Judge Vohrah's
vision appears more fair.4"
V. CONTEXTUALIZING EQUALITY OF ARMS BY THE
ICTY AND ICTR
Should the principle of equality of arms be defined differently when applied in the context of international criminal tribunals rather than national tribunals? Although from the jurisprudence of the international tribunals it appears that a connection
is sought with the vision of the ECHR on this point,4 ' the application of this principle by the ICTY Appeals Chamber has indeed been contextualized in order to accommodate the characteristics specific to an international criminal tribunal such as the
ICTY.
First, it has been established that the suspect's right to adequate opportunities and facilities to prepare his or her defense,
as set forth in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute, should be considered an essential element of the right to a fair trial pursuant to
Article 20 of the Statute.4 2 This interpretation does indeed give
room for some form of "substantive equality."4 3
36. Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of
Evidence (Feb. 16, 1999).
37. See id. 25.
38. See generally Knoops, supra note 27.
39. See KNoops, supra note 3, at 125.
40. See JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE
592 (2003).
41. See supra Parts III-IV.
42. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
47,
52 (July 15, 1999).
43. See RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 269
(2002).
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Second, this also means that the ICTY Appeals Chamber accepted a somewhat broader interpretation of equality of arms
than the definition formulated by the ECHR with respect to national criminal cases. The ICTYjustifies this approach by pointing out that a proper defense before international tribunals experiences problems when evidence must be obtained from
States.4 4 The Appeals Chamber observed:
Under the Statute of the International Tribunal[,] the principle of equality of arms must be given a more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to proceedings
before domestic courts. This principle means that the Prosecution and the Defence must be equal before the Trial Chamber. It follows that the Chamber shall provide every practicable facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and Statute when faced with a request by a party for assistance in
presenting its case. 4 5
Third, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has summed up the following procedural facilities which, according to the tribunal,
should be part of equality of arms from the defense perspective:
- the adoption of protective measures, including the grant
of limited immunity from prosecution in the form of safe
conduct;
- the taking of evidence by video-link or deposition;
- the issuance of binding orders to States for the production of evidence;
- the compelling of a witness's testimony by asking the
court to subpoena witnesses or to call as court witnesses
persons who would be reluctant to testify on behalf of the
defense; and
- the possibility of conceiving situations where a fair trial is
not possible because witnesses central to the defense case
do not appear due to the obstructionist efforts of a State,
which could eventually lead to a stay of the proceedings.4 6
In contrast to the ICTY's apparent widening of the principle
of equality of arms in favor of the defense in its 1999 Tadic decision, a more recent judgment by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in
fact forms a contraindication. In a judgment from 2001, the
ICTR Appeals Chamber considered that:
44. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
45. Id. 52.
46. See id.
52-55.

51.
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The Appeals Chamber concurs with ICTY Appeals Chamber's
position expressed in Tadic that the principle of equality of
arms does not apply to "conditions, outside the control of a
court," that prevented a party from securing the attendance
of certain witnesses. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Kayishema's claim that problems encountered in locating and contacting potential witnesses allegedly constitutes an
error in fact and in law under Article 20 of the Statute.4 7
The question therefore arises whether this recent verdict can be
seen as abandoning or limiting the principle of equality of arms.
In sum, it could be argued that rather than adopting its regular meaning within national criminal contexts, it is not unreasonable to interpret equality of arms more extensively within international criminal procedures when it concerns the position of
the accused with respect to both procedural and substantive
law. 4' The Appeals Chamber 1999 Tadic decision still offers sufficient support for this view.
VI. THE APPLICATION OFEQUALITY OF ARMS BY THE ICTY
AMD ICTR RELATIVE TO STATE COOPERATION
The first case of the ICTY, the Tadic case, provides insight
into the question of how the ICTY applied the principle of
equality of arms with respect to State cooperation. In the Tadic
appeal case, the first appeal ground was the argument that: "The
appellant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced as there was no
equality of arms between the Prosecutor and the Defense due to
the prevailing circumstances in which the trial was conducted."4 9
More specifically, the defense argued that an effective defense
was thwarted as a result of lack of State cooperation, and even
obstruction, during the proceedings by the Republic Srpska,
(i.e., the local Serbian authorities in Prijedor).
The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument and accepted
the prosecutor's reasoning that equality of arms involves equality
only in a procedural sense and not in a substantive sense, including when concerning the cooperation of States with the defense
before the ICTY.5 ° Of importance is the fact that, in this regard,
47. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment
(Reasons), 1 70 (June 1, 2001).
48. See MAY & WIERDA, supra note 43, at 267-68.
49. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 20.
50. Id. 52.
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the ICTY Appeals Chamber primarily based its decision on jurisprudence of the ECHR, stating that "[t]here is nothing in the
ECHR case law that suggests that the principle is applicable to
conditions, outside the control of a court, that prevented a party
from securing the attendance of certain witnesses. All the cases
applications that the judicial body had the power to
considered
51
grant."
The question remains, however, whether the rejection of
the defense argument based on ECHR case law is correct. After
all, cases brought before the ECHR usually involve complaints
relating to relatively stable States and democracies that have police organizations capable of maintaining law and order and ensuring the appearance of witnesses before local courts. 52 Such
circumstances did not exist in the Tadic case: The Chief of Police in question from Prijedor was himself indicted by the ICTY
for genocide, and, two months after the Tadic trial, he was shot
by Stabilization Force ("SFOR") troops when he tried to escape
his arrest.53 Clearly, in the Tadic case, the Court dealt with a
situation where it was not at all certain whether particular witnesses could be brought to the ICTY via the cooperation of local
to the ICTY, but
police. Situations such as these are not unique
54
also occur before the ICTR and the SCSL.
In view of the particular legal-political context in which
criminal cases before international tribunals occur and the complex political and geo-political relations at stake for the State involved, the principle of equality of arms in relation to State cooperation ought to have a specific meaning. In this context, the
principle should arguably be applied on a teleological basis in
that it should predominantly work in favor of the defense and
less in favor of the prosecutor who, after all, operates from a less
51. Id. 49.
52. SeeJoNEs AND POWLES, supra note 40, at 591.
53. See A Case by Case Analysis of Recent Crises Assessing 20 Years of HumanitarianAction 76 n.74 (Mhdecins du Monde, International Conference, Protecting People in
Times of War, Working Paper) (Florence Trintignac ed.), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/medmonde.pdf.
54. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 A.J.I.L. 510, 529-30 (2003)
(noting that the ICTR and ICTY have had difficulty in obtaining State cooperation);
BringingJustice: The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone 39 (Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16, No.
8(A), 2004) (detailing the SCSL's difficulty in apprehending and trying former dictator
Charles Taylor).
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disadvantaged procedural position. Equality of arms should
therefore ensure that the defense has adequate means to prepare and present its case. These means should at least be equal
to those available to the prosecutor, who usually has all the advantages of a supportive State apparatus.
The counterargument, that prosecutors before international tribunals, just like the defense, have to rely on the cooperation of States for investigation and prosecution and therefore
meet the same problems as the defense," seems unconvincing.
After all, the prosecutors not only have more financial means at
their disposal to pursue an inquiry in the State concerned,5 6 but
they can also resort to a legal-political mandate in support of the
investigation to persuade or even rely on enforcement measures
to ensure that a State hands over evidentiary documents. An example of this is the economic sanctions imposed by the United
Nations ("U.N.") on Serbia and Montenegro, which were initiated by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and precluded that
State from becoming a European Union member." Such legalpolitical mechanisms are not at the disposal of the defense
before these types of tribunals.
The Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL Agreement")5" further illustrates
the inequality of positions before international criminal tribunals. Addressing cooperation with the Special Court, Article 17
stipulates the following:
1. The Government shall cooperate with all organs of the Special Court at all stages of the proceedings. It shall, in particular, facilitate access to the Prosecutor to sites, persons and relevant documents required for the investigation.
2. The Government shall comply without undue delay with
55. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case. No. IT-94-1-A, Trial Decision on Prosecution Motion
for Production of Defence Witness Statements, Separate and Dissenting Opinion by
Judge McDonald,
32 (Nov. 27, 1996).
56. See Knoops, supra note 27, at 1583.
57. See JoNEs AND PowLEs, supra note 40, at 839 (mentioning various reports to the
Security Council on non-cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro, including Serbia's refusal to render General Mladic to the ICTY as an obstacle to Serbia's potential membership in the EU).
58. Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
38342 [hereinafter SCSL Agreement].
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any request for assistance by the Special Court or an order
issued by the Chambers, including, but not limited to:
(a) Identification and location of persons;
(b) Service of documents;
(c) Arrest or detention of persons;
59
(d) Transfer of an indictee to the Court.
A plain reading of Article 17, particularly under Section 1,
reveals that only the Prosecution is mentioned with respect to
the provision of access to certain locations, persons, and relevant
documents for the purpose of the investigation.
Remarkably, Article 17 does not mention the defense, who
acts before the Special Court and who should have similar access.6 ° In 2004, in one of the cases before the Special Court, the
defense asked the Chief Registrar of the tribunal for a more extensive interpretation of Article 17(1), arguing that it should
also apply to potential witnesses for the defense who are not accessible to the defense or against the testimony of whom the domestic authorities create obstacles.6" In this particular instance,
the response of the Chief Registrar of the Special Court was negative. Accordingly, the SCSL did not endorse equality of arms,
and the argument that the prosecution encounters the same
problems as the defense when it comes to State cooperation in
procedures before international tribunals certainly does not apply here.6 2
VII. THE CRITERIA FOR AND LIMITATIONS OF STATE
COOPERATION BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Having outlined a significant problem with respect to State
cooperation before international criminal tribunals, i.e., the unequal position of the defense in comparison to the prosecution,
we will review the criteria developed by the ICTY and ICTR for
invoking State cooperation.
The system of State cooperation within these criminal tribu59. SCSL Agreement, supra note 58, art. 17 (emphasis added).
60. See KNoops, supra note 16, at 321-22.
61. Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Decision on Defence Motion
in Respect of Santigie Borbor Kanu for an Order Under Rule 54 with Respect to Release of Exculpatory Evidence (June 1, 2004), available at http://www.sc-si.org/Documents/SCSL-04-16-PT-091.pdf.
62. Id.
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nals is mainly 'judge-made," meaning that as the statutes of these
tribunals are not conclusive with respect to these criteria, the
judges before these tribunals ultimately created more clarity
through their judgments. 63 In contrast to the ICC system, which
is based on a treaty rather than on a Security Council Resolution
like the ICTY and ICTR, States are obliged by these tribunals to
cooperate with respect to procedures before these fora or risk
the imposition of U.N. sanctions.
A landmark decision in this respect is the ICTY Appeals
Chamber decision Prosecutorv. Blaskic, in which the Court formulated the following four criteria for issuing a binding order to a
State to hand over documents to the tribunal. 64 A request
should:
(i) identify specific documents and not broad categories;
(ii) set out the relevance of the documents to trial;
(iii) not be unduly onerous; and
65
(iv) give the State sufficient time for compliance.
For a second reason, the Blaskic decision proved important
to the aspect of State cooperation with respect to procedures
before international tribunals. In contrast to the Trial Chamber,
the Appeals Chamber ruled that a subpoena for a certain person
to testify (a subpoena duces tecum) can be issued against neither a
State nor an authority of a State, but only against private individuals.6 6 States and State officials can, according to the Appeals
Chamber, only be subject to binding orders. 67 This way, the
ICTY also ruled that subpoenas cannot be issued against international organizations.6 8
The distinction between subpoenas and binding orders is of
importance mainly with respect to sanctions in case of non-cooperation with ICTY procedures. When an individual refuses to cooperate, for example by not appearing in court to testify, a tribu63. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 357.

64. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Judgment on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chambers II of 18 July 1997,
32 (Oct. 29, 1997).
65. See id.
66. See id. 38.
67. Id. 39.
68. See Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case No. IT-97-24, Decision Refusing Defence Motion for Subpoena, 4 (June 23, 1998) (concerning the question of whether the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe could be summoned to appear before
the tribunal).
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nal can start contempt of court procedures. These procedures
cannot be initiated against a State which ignores a binding order, for example to transfer evidence.6 9
The Blaskic Appeals Chamber decision was also important
for the development of State cooperation in terms of international criminal law for a third reason. In the Blaskic case, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber judges left the possibility open that
States can refuse cooperation based on national security concerns, but stipulated that a refusal to hand over documents or
other evidence to the tribunal is subject to strict limitations and
that it is ultimately up to the Court to decide.7" In other words,
an ICTYjudge can determine whether claims of national security
concerns are unfounded. If the judge so finds, the State will be
under the obligation to cooperate despite its claims. If the State
does not cooperate, then the Court can report this to the Secur71
ity Council, which can impose sanctions as a result.
VIII. THE ICC STATE COOPERATION SYSTEM
In contrast to the ICTR/ICTY system, where State cooperation is stipulated in only one article in their respective statutes,7 2
and which is sometimes described as a "supra-State model, 73 the
ICC Statute takes a "State-oriented approach," which contains elements of the traditional horizontal model with respect to legal
aid between States. 74 This gives rise to several important differences.
First, the ICC Statute contains detailed and specific regulations concerning State cooperation in order to define obligations of ICC Member States as precisely as possible with respect
to disclosing evidence to the ICC and securing the availability of
69. See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, 11 33, 57-60; see also CASSESE, supra note 16, at
357-58 (comparing available tribunal action for non-compliance with subpoenas directed toward private individuals with binding orders directed towards States).
70. See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14,
61-69; CASSESE, supra note 16, at 357.
71. See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14,
68; see also CASSESE, supra note 16, at 357-58
(discussing the procedure for a State to assert national security concerns as the basis for
an exemption to complying with a binding order).
72. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 28.
73. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 356-57 (noting that the tribunals are referred to
as "supra-State" due to their basis in a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council).
74. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 358; see also KNOOps, supra note 16, at 181 (noting
that the ICC relies on State cooperation).
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witnesses.7 5 This curtails judicial discretion, while at the same
time the drafters of the ICC Statute intended to implement particular "legislative" safeguards for the Member States. 76 However, the ICC did not address one particular question: Should
the collection of evidence and the execution of arrest warrants
be assigned to and executed by the authorities of the particular
State concerned, or can this be done by the ICC prosecutor? As
it is assumed in the statute that this type of action should be
executed in accordance with national legislation, the former option may be preferred.7 7
Second, an important characteristic of the ICC system with
respect to State cooperation results from the influence of the
principle of complementarity. This principle means that a certain situation or case falls under ICC jurisdiction only when an
ICC State Party cannot or refuses to investigate or prosecute. 7
In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, which are based on primacy
over national jurisdiction, the relationship between the ICC and
national jurisdictions is based on primacy of the latter over the
first.79 In the ICC system it thus follows that State cooperation
with the ICC can be stopped or delayed due to the principle of
complementarity.
Third, with respect to the issue of "national security interests," the ICC system also has a specific regulation concerning
State cooperation, which has been included in the statute and
has its own characteristics. Different from the restrictive approach of the ICTY and ICTR as laid down in the Blaskic case,
the ICC Statute starts from the position that State Parties have
considerable room to opt to secure their national security information instead of placing it at the disposal of the ICC. ° A special exception has been included in Article 93(4) of the statute
where State cooperation for disclosure of "evidence which re75. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 86-102.
76. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 358.
77. See id.; see also, Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of
Documents into the Record, 50-55, 63-65 (Feb. 24, 2006).
78. See HtCTOR OLASOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 145-50 (Martin Nkjhoff ed., 2005).
79. See id. at 146.
80. See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 359-60; see also KNoops, supra note 16, at 173-81
(noting that the emphasis is placed on the right of States to deny the request for information).
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lates to... national security" does not have to be granted. 8 ' Article 72 of the ICC Statute introduces a complex system to try
nonetheless to induce State Parties to provide as much information as possible, for example, through consultations with the
Court. However, when a State wishes to withhold information
for national security reasons, such consultations are time consuming, incriminating, and in practice are not likely to result in
a positive outcome.8 2
While the ICTY and ICTR emphasize obliging States to
hand over information to these tribunals, the ICC system-as
seen under Article 72 of the Statute-emphasizes the right of
States to refuse to cooperate with the ICC. 3 Article 87(7) of the
ICC Statute provides an arrangement to report such refusals either to the Assembly of State Parties ("ASP") or, in the event the
U.N. Security Council referred the case to the ICC, to the Security Council itself.84
In conclusion, with the ICC it is more likely that inculpatory
or exculpatory evidence against a suspect will not be handed
over by a State. For the ICTR and ICTY, this risk is less likely
since only in exceptional circumstances can cooperation be refused by a State on the grounds of "State security interests."
IX. DEFENSE-DRIVEN STATE COOPERATION BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: AN EXAMPLE 5
Having looked at the criteria and conditions of State cooperation at the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, this Section examines how
the defense before international criminal tribunals can ensure
State cooperation in order to discharge its defense duties adequately.
The following case from the SCSL is illustrative. This example pertains to the first case where, within the system of mixed
criminal tribunals, the SCSL system of State cooperation was
challenged. The case raised the question of whether and how to
apply State cooperation criteria as laid down in the Blaskic Ap81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 93(4).
See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 359.
See id. at 360.
Id.
See KNoops, supra note 16, at 319-22.
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peals Chamber decision. On June 1, 2004, in the case of Prosecutor v. Kanu, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court adopted the
criteria from the Blaskic decision, 6 and so acknowledged the importance of the vertical model of State cooperation in the context of mixed criminal tribunals. The SCSL Trial Chamber considered the following:
Guided persuasively by the principles enunciated by the ICTY
in the Blaskic Judgment, as Designated Judge, I now proceed
to adopt with modifications, if necessary, the test laid down in
that case, for the purpose of applications of this type brought
before the Special Court. In my considered opinion, Article
17 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone and section 21 of the Ratification
Act together form the doctrinal bedrock of the machinery for
cooperation between the Government of Sierra Leone and
the Court in the execution of its statutory mandate.
On a level of specificity, articulated in paragraphs 27-29 are
the three key principles for future guidance of the Court in
determining the merits of applications of this nature. First,
the Special Court lacks legal authority to apply any enforcement measures against the State of Sierra Leone, there being
no express statutory authority in the founding instruments of
the Court for that purpose, nor can it be asserted that the
Court's inherent jurisdiction includes such power. Any other
view of the law on this theme would amount to a disregard for
or encroachment upon the entrenched doctrine of State sovereignty.
Second, predicated upon its founding instruments, the Special Court, not being endowed with enforcement agents of its
own, must depend and rely upon the cooperation of the sovereign State of Sierra Leone in order to prosecute persons
alleged to bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law during the hostilities
which took place during the rebel war. In essence, under the
statutory cooperation scheme, there devolves upon the State
of Sierra Leone an international contractual obligation,
which is treaty-based, to assist the Special Court effectively in86. Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Decision on Defence Motion
in Respect of Santigie Borbor Kanu for an Order under Rule 54 with Respect to Release
of Exculpatory Evidence,
25-29 (June 1, 2004).
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vestigate crimes, collect evidence, summon witnesses and
have indictees arrested and delivered to the Special Court.
Third, as emphasized in Blaskic in respect ... [to] . . . Article
29 of the ICTY Statute, the power granted to the ICTY to issue
orders to sovereign States is exceptional and novel, one not
hitherto recognized under customary international law. To
the same extent, analogically, does Article 17 of the Special
Court's Statute create the unique power authorizing the Special Court to issue orders to the sovereign State of Sierra Leone. It follows, therefore, that the contractual obligation created under the bilateral arrangement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone specifically applies
to cases where the State of Sierra Leone is required to produce documents in possession of its officials.8 7
The adoption of the Blaskic standard acknowledges the importance of the vertical model of State cooperation within the
context of a mixed or hybrid criminal court. In essence, the
judges of the Special Court applied the Blaskic principles by analogy to their own cases. Based on the bilateral agreement between the U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone with respect
to the establishment of the SCSL, the Court imposed a contractual obligation on Sierra Leone and its agents to endorse State
cooperation with the SCSL.8 s Therefore, for the first time, a
mixed criminal court adopted the criteria for State cooperation
from an international criminal court. Accordingly, this decision
could set a precedent for the scope of State cooperation for
other and future criminal tribunals. After all, the reasoning of
the Trial Chamber of the SCSL was that, in the absence of enforcement agents of its own, tribunals such as the SCSL have to
rely on State cooperation. 8 9 Despite the existence of the doctrine of State sovereignty, which implies a potential limitation for
State cooperation, the mentioned international contractual obligation supersedes this doctrine when it concerns collecting evidence and other State cooperation modalities.
One could say that this rather innovative approach is primarily based on respect for mutual obligations that arise when in87. Id.
88. See SCSL Agreement, supra note 58, art. 17.
89. See Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on Defense Motion
for an Order under Rule 54 with Respect to Release of Exculpatory Evidence,
27-29
(June 1, 2004).
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ternational organizations such as the U.N. enter an agreement
with a certain government with the aim to set up a tribunal. According to the Trial Chamber, this brings about a binding obligation for a sovereign State to cooperate with an international or
mixed criminal tribunal.90 The legal force of this obligation is
derived mainly from Article 17 of the aforementioned SCSL
Agreement, which is in fact identical to the formulation in the
Blaskic Appeals Chamber decision." On this point, the SCSL
Trial Chamber based its decision on an analogous interpretation
of Article 29 of the ICTY Statute. 92 It is this analogy which, according to the Special Court, creates the obligation for the Government of Sierra Leone to hand over documents it has in its
possession.
One problem that has not been addressed by the Special
Court is State cooperation with respect to third party States, for
instance, States other than Sierra Leone. After all, these third
parties are not party to the SCSL Agreement. The obligatory
judicial character of State cooperation with Sierra Leone, as is
currently accepted by the Special Court, does not include such
other States. Thus, this remains a problem for both the prosecution and the defense in case either party, for example, wishes to
obtain certain evidence from such a State. The same goes for
the cooperation of international organizations with internationalized tribunals.
A further issue that is left open is whether the mandatory
nature of State cooperation understood in this way also includes
arresting individuals or making witnesses available to testify.
One may conclude, therefore, that the system of State cooperation at mixed criminal tribunals, from an equality of arms perspective applied to the defense, meets even more fundamental
problems than those encountered at international criminal
tribunals.

90. See id. 1 28.
91. See id. 9 19-24.
92. See id. 99 23-24.
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X. DUALITY IN STATE COOPERATION WITHIN
NATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES
A. The Legitimacy of State Requests for Mutual Assistance
Reflecting "DualState" Notions
When assessing State cooperation within national criminal
cases, one may observe that the notion of the Dual State
emerges. Particularly with respect to State requests for mutual
assistance in criminal matters, instruments of international judicial cooperation may feature as mechanisms at the disposal of
political authorities under the umbrella of the Normative State,
while it is clear that the Prerogative State is de facto exercising
its powers arbitrarily. This observation raises two separate issues:
(1) whether State requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters can be deemed legally valid when these requests are a mere
reflection of the Dual State in that they are exponents of the
Prerogative State, and (2) whether the requested State, when
complying with such requests of the requesting State, can be
held responsible for violations of certain international norms.
1. The Prerogative (Requesting) State
As to the first question, it should be observed that all treaties regarding mutual assistance in criminal matters rely upon
governments abiding by the rule of law, including norms of due
process. The U.N. Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of December 14, 1990 provides in Article 2 that the
treaty shall not affect obligations subsisting between the parties,
whether pursuant to other treaties or arrangements or otherwise.9" Consequently, State requests for mutual assistance which
have no bona fide basis or are administered ultra vires, i.e., in
order to circumvent the rule of law by seeking assistance in criminal cases within which human rights are not upheld, could be
qualified as null and void.9 4 It can be argued that, if it is to be
established that such requests for mutual assistance in criminal
matters are de facto instruments of the Prerogative State, hiding
its true face behind legitimate institutions and laws, these requests could and should be challenged within a court of law.
93. Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, G.A. Res. 45/117, art.
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/117 (Dec. 14, 1990).
94. See id. art. 4 (describing conditions upon which a party may deny a request for
mutual assistance).
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Inevitably, compliance with such requests can undermine the
rule of law, which also governs inter-State relations, in view of
the fact that individuals are no longer objects of international
law, but constitute independent subjects, inhering self-executing
rights deriving from fundamental norms of international human
rights.
The qualification that such requests for mutual assistance
could be deemed null and void finds support in the doctrine of
abuse of process, which is upheld by international criminal tribunals and applies to cases where the fundamental human rights of
the suspect or accused have been grossly infringed by the investigating or prosecuting authorities.9 5 Based upon the case law of
the mentioned tribunals, this doctrine can be seen as a general
principle of international law, closely intertwined with the rationale that it would be illogical and inconsistent to proclaim a fundamental human right without having remedies in case such a
right is violated. No valid reason exists to exclude the phenomenon of mutual assistance in criminal matters from the development of this general principle of international law. Importantly,
when misconduct of law enforcement agents is related to the unlawful gathering of evidence, an international court, and a fortior also a national court, may suppress or exclude the particular
evidence.9 6 Also, under various domestic laws, courts are endowed with considerable discretion in choosing the most appropriate remedy against serious abuses of process.9 7 This can also
be derived from Article 13 of the ECHR, which mandates that
States should provide for effective remedies in case of violation
of human rights.9 8
95. See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-95-1, Appeals Chamber Decision,
§ IV(B) (Nov. 3, 1999); see also Prosecutor v. Nikolize, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality Of Arrest,
29-30 (June 5, 2003) (finding that a court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction in cases where serious international
human ights violations involved in the case would jeopardize court integrity).
96. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision on the Defense Motion
for "Sanctions for Prosecutor's Repeated Violations of Rule 68 of the Rules Of Procedure And Evidence,"
21 (Apr. 29, 1998).
97. See, e.g., Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks ("UPK") [Criminal Procedure Code]
art. 125(5) (Russ.) (describingjudicial authority to decide remedies in Russian criminal
proceedings).
98. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights].
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2. State Responsibility of Requested State
With respect to the second question, there is a compelling
argument that the requested State bears an independent responsibility for its compliance with requests fuelled by the Prerogative
requesting State as opposed to those from the Normative requesting State. The case law of the ECHR clearly envisions expanding the responsibility for requested States under international law to uphold fundamental norms of human rights, even
when these violations ultimately take place within the territory of
the requested State."9
A rather underexposed international legal instrument in
this area is the Articles on State Responsibility for International
Wrongful Acts ("ILC Articles"), adopted by the International
Law Commission on August 9, 2001 and included in Resolution
56/83 adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on January 28,
2002.100
Articles 1 and 2 of the ILC Articles describe the elements
underlying the existence of such an international wrongful act.
Violation of an international obligation by a State, which is attributable to that State according to international law, results in
such an international wrongful act, triggering international liability for the State in question. 101
Article 12 provides the definition of a violation of an international obligation. With respect to requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters, it is important to determine that not
acting according to customary or treaty rules on human rights
can be qualified as "an act of that State . . .not in conformity
with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its
' 10 2
origin or character."
In that respect, it is relevant that, according to Article 16 of
the ILC Articles, the aforementioned State responsibility is ex99. See id. pmbl.
100. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. A/Res/
56/589/Annex (Jan. 28, 2002); see alsoJAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S

ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:

INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES

(2002) (providing commentary on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).
101. See G.A. Res. A/Res/56/589/Annex, supra note 100, arts. 2, 28-33; see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 100, at 191-210 (offering commentary on international liability
for State violations of international obligations).
102. G.A. Res. A/Res/56/589/Annex, supra note 100, art. 12; see also CRAWFORD,
supra note 100, at 125-30 (providing analysis of the implications of Article 12).
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tended to "a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act" if the conditions have
been met that the requested State renders this assistance while
having knowledge of the circumstances of the existence of this
violation of the ECHR, as well as that the act if carried10 out
by the
3
State requested would be "internationally wrongful.
It is important that, based upon the provisions of ILC Articles 28-31, States have the obligation to stop violations10 4 and to
give guarantees against a repetition of the occurrence of the "internationally wrongful act."'0 5 Denial of requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters in such situations can therefore be
considered "an obligation to make full reparation for the injury
caused by the internationally wrongful act," for which national
internal law cannot be a justification for non-compliance. 0 6
In sum, the phenomenon of the Dual State may serve as a
legal threshold in judicial considerations surrounding requests
for mutual assistance in criminal matters of States, applied both
to the requesting State (abuse of powers) and the requested
State (State responsibility based upon the ILC Articles).
B. Realpolitik Factors within the System of Inter-State

Cooperation in Judicial Matters
Put into a broader perspective, the concept of the Dual
State as developed by Fraenkel can serve as a useful backdrop
when assessing the interplay between State cooperation and
equality of arms within national criminal cases. Similar to State
cooperation before international or internationalized criminal
tribunals, the question arises whether the phenomena of the
Dual State occur with the same intensity in national criminal
cases. At first sight, the signalled duality in State cooperation
presents itself now that the horizontal model of State cooperation in its traditional sense is also subjected to the imposition of
political powers. This is evidenced by the fact that the judicial
103. G.A. Res. A/Res/56/589/Annex, supra note 100, art. 16; see also CRAWFORD,
supra note 100, at 148-51 (discussing the potential applications of Article 16).
104. G.A. Res. A/Res/56/589/Annex, supra note 100, art. 30(a); see also CRAwFORD, supra note 100, at 196-98 (describing the implications of Article 30(a)).
105. G.A. Res. A/Res/56/589/Annex, supra note 100, art. 30(b); see also CRAwFORD, supra note 100, at 198-200 (outlining the provisions of Article 30(b)).
106. G.A. Res. A/Res/56/589/Annex, supra note 100, art. 32; see also CRAWFORD,
supra note 100, at 207-08 (analyzing the language of Article 32).
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system of inter-State cooperation, such as extradition and surrender, has several exceptions of a political nature.10 7 Within this
inter-State system of State cooperation, sovereign States have
108
considerable discretionary powers to refuse to cooperate.
This impact of realpolitik on State cooperation within national criminal cases may give rise to violations of the ECHR by
the States involved. That the obligations of parties to the ECHR
to guarantee that the rights arising from this convention apply to
extraterritorial incidents0 ' is clear from the functional interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction in the case Soering v. United
Kingdom. 110 In this case, the European Commission of Human
Rights ("ECHR") decided that although contracting States are
not held responsible for the possible violations of human rights
in other States, they are responsible for the decision to carry out
certain cooperative acts that arise from these violations."'
Clearly, the mere fact that a State has acceded to the ECHR does
not guarantee compliance with the human rights norms as laid
12
down in this Convention.'

107. See CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, EXTRADITION, POLITICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 79-83
(2001); see also John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with
Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 187-88 (1998) (outlining the political offense
exception to international extradition treaties).
108. See Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 107, at 189; see also Aukje A.H.
van Hoek & Michiel J.J.P. Luchtman, Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Matters and
the Safeguardingof Human Rights, 1 UTRECHT LAw REv. 2, 20-22 (2005), availableat bttp:/
/www.utrechtlawreview.org/ (describing ways that sovereign States may refuse to cooperate with international endeavors).
109. This obligation of parties to the European Convention on Human Rights to
guarantee the rights and freedoms of each person staying within their jurisdiction is an
objective binding obligation. See Ire. v. Gr. Brit., App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25,
97-102 (1980); see also AALT WILLEM HERINGA, EUROPEES VERDRAG VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN
DE MENS: RECHTSPRAAK & COMMENTAAR

3.1.2 (1998).

110. See Soering v. U. K, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36
(1989); see also HERINGA, supra note 109, 3.1.3.
111. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36; Varas v. Swed., 201 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1991), Bader v. Swed., App. No. 13284/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
41
(2005), availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/ (discussing Articles 2 and 6, in addition to
the (impending) violation of Article 3); see also Mamatkulov v. Turk., 41 Eur. H.R. Rep.
494, 518 (2004); Drozd v. Fr., 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1992) (Matscher, J.,
dissenting).
112. See van Hoek & Luchtman, supra note 108, at 9-10.

286

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol.30:260

C. ContemporaryDevelopments on State Responsibility for Inter-State
Cooperation: Transposition of European Union Law onto
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters by States
The latter conclusion finds support in the European Court's
Bosphorus v. Ireland judgment of June 30, 2005.'1 On March 25,
1997, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm, an airline charter company incorporated in Turkey ("the applicant"), lodged an application against Ireland with the European Commission of Human
Rights under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom ("Convention"). Ireland had implemented the sanctions pursuant to Security Council Resolution 820'14 against the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by impounding its aircraft, one of
which was in Ireland for maintenance. The applicant (who
leased two Boeing 737-300 aircraft from '"AT" Yugoslav Airlines)
argued that the impounding was a reviewable exercise of discretion within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention and a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.115 The Government of
Ireland disagreed, as did the third parties, with the exception (in
part) of the Institut de Formationen Droits de l'Homme du Barreau de
116
Paris.

The reasoning of the European Court judges is of relevance
to States' requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters. The
following observations of the Court reflect upon State responsibilities to comply with fundamental human rights within the
context of supra-national cooperation in criminal cases, even
when the treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters transfer sovereign powers under the notion that treaty compliance
constitutes a legitimate State interest.
First, the Court recognizes the "growing importance of international co-operation and of the consequent need to secure
the proper function of international organisations." 1 7
113. See Bosphorus v. Ire., App. No. 45036/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2005), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/.
114. S.C. Res. 820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993). Security Council Resolution 820 was implemented by European Economic Community Regulation 990/93,
which entered into force on April 28, 1993. Council Regulation No. 990/93, O.J. L
102/14 (1993).
115. Bosphorus, App. No. 45036/98,
107.
116. Id.
117. Id. 150.
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Second, "the Court has recognised that absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility
in the areas covered by such a transfer would be incompatible
with the purpose and object of the Convention: the guarantees
of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will thereby
depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the
practical and effective nature of its safeguards."" 8
Third, "[i]n the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant
organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be
considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention
provides."' "
Fourth, the Court held that " [i] f such equivalent protection
is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements
of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation. 12 °
Finally, the Court concluded that "such presumption can be
rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international co-operation
would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a 'constitutional instrument of European public order' in the field of
human rights."''
With regard to the analogy with States' requests for mutual
assistance in criminal matters, the Bosphorus court attached
weight to whether the international instruments were freely entered into in order to determine if the European Convention
was violated. The Court stated that "[t] he Matthews case can also
be distinguished: The acts for which the United Kingdom was
found responsible were 'international instruments which were
freely entered into' by it."1 22 The same goes for bilateral or multilateral conventions on mutual assistance in criminal matters, to
which States can freely accede. Consequently, the observations
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

154.
155.
156.
157.
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of the Court can be transposed onto the phenomenon of State
cooperation in criminal cases, and specifically to States' requests
for mutual assistance in criminal matters. This conclusion reinforces the existence of State responsibility in this area, presupposing the rebuttable presumption in a specific case that the
protection of human rights by the requesting State was manifestly deficient.
D. A Case Report: The Russian ProceedingsAgainst Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and the Yukos Oil Company
1. General Remarks
The criminal and civil proceedings against Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and the Yukos oil company that he headed exemplify the aforementioned transposition of the concept of the
Dual State onto inter-State cooperation in criminal cases. These
proceedings make clear the existence of the mentioned element
of duality within State cooperation, as evidenced by actions undertaken by the Russian authorities. The relevant facts of this
case are illustrative.
Since 1996, the Russian entrepreneur Mikhail Khodorkovsky had been the guiding force behind Yukos, a formerly Stateowned company privatized in the mid-1990s through its sale to
the Menatep Group-a group of Russian investors. 123 Yukos subsequently became one of the world's largest oil producers, and,
as a shareholder in Yukos, Khodorkovsky accumulated considerable wealth.1 24 Besides this economic power, Khodorkovsky also
gained political influence due to his high visibility as a philanthropist and outspoken advocate of civil society. He also provided financial support to Russian political opposition parties.
Prior to his arrest, Khodorkovsky was one of the most high-profile political opponents of the Russian executive and one of the
most effective competitors to State-owned energy companies. As
such, Khodorkovsky was perceived by the Kremlin as challenging
125
the leadership of President Vladimir Putin.
123. See Paul Klebnikov, The Oligarch Who Came in from the Cold, FoRBES, Mar. 18,
2002 available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0318/110-print.html.
124. Id.
125. See C.J. Chivers & Erin E. Arvedlund, Russia Tycoon Given 9 Years on Tax
Charge,N.Y. TiME,June 1, 2005, at Al; see also BBC NEWS, Profile: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3213505.stm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
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In July 2003, the Russian authorities started the prosecution
of the Yukos company and the corresponding confiscation process of the properties of this international company, which resulted in the seizure of Yukos property at the end of 2004, and
finally in the sale of the most important oil production branch of
Yukos to an oil company controlled by the Kremlin. 126 In October 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested by heavily armed Russian
Special Forces, while on board a plane refuelling at a Siberian
airport. 2 7 He was flown to Moscow and indicted for the alleged
fraudulent acquisition and sale of shares in a fertilizer company
in 1994, as well as for a series of other alleged frauds. 128 On May
31, 2005, Khodorkovsky was convicted. On September 22, following his appeal, he was sentenced to nine years imprisonment
after a patently abusive judicial process.1 29 Khodorkovsky is now
serving his sentence in a remote Siberian prison camp, essentially a political prisoner.
2. The Element of the "Prerogative State"
As is evident from an examination of the events that unfolded throughout this affair and as concluded by, among
others, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
("PACE"),"' a large number of violations of the Russian Constitution and the ECHR occurred against Khodorkovsky and
others. The most fundamental rights of the accused were disregarded in a gross and persistent manner. These violations, including violations of Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR, included a
total lack of independence of the Russian judicial authorities
handling the case, the ransacking of and seizure of documents
from the offices of one of Khodorkovsky's lawyers in violation of
attorney-client privilege, and the restriction of the access of the
126. See Profile: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, supra note 125.
127. See id.
128. See Chivers, supra note 125; Steven Lee Myers & Sabrina Tavernise, In Resigning Oil Post, Jailed Russian Hints at PoliticalFight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at Al.
129. SeeJeremy Page, Sent to Siberia: The Oligarch Who Had It All-and Lost It, TIMES
(LONDON), Oct. 29, 2005 available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,135091847845,00.html.
130. See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1418, (Jan.
25, 2005) [hereinafter PACE Res. 1418], available at http://assembly.coe.int/ ; see also
Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, The Circumstances Surroundingthe Arrest and Prosecution of Leading Yukos Executives, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Nov.
29, 2004).
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accused to legal counsel. 3 ' Both the criminal and tax proceedings were clearly politically motivated, since only Khodorkovsky
and Yukos were singled out by the authorities for the alleged
offenses, which involved common industry practices under the
legal regime existing at the time. Furthermore, Khodorkovsky
was transferred in October 2005 to Krasnokomensk, a remote
Siberian prison camp where the conditions of detention are
abominable, with prisoners suffering from tuberculosis, dysentery, and gangrene, and subject to radioactive contamination
from the nearby Priargunskoye uranium mine. 13 2 In its Resolution 1418, PACE concluded that the findings "including facts
pointing to serious procedural violations committed by different
law enforcement agencies against Mr. Khodorkovsky call into
question the fairness, impartiality, and objectivity of the authorities, which appear to have acted excessively in disregard of fundamental rights of the defense guaranteed by the Russian Crimi133
nal Procedure Code and by the ECHR.'
During and after the trial against Khodorkovsky, Russia submitted requests to a number of countries for legal assistance in
prosecuting him. These countries included the Netherlands,
Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.1 3 4 In 2004 and 2005, Russia requested that the Dutch authorities transfer financial and administrative documents regarding several Dutch companies and the
interview notes of the management of those companies, pursuant to various searches and seizures. 135 In addition, the Russian
authorities requested that Great Britain extradite three co-accuseds of Khodorkovsky, a request that was refused by a British
judge, who held that the trials that would await these co-accuseds
would be politically motivated in the same way the proceedings
3 6
against Khodorkovsky had been.1
131. See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 130, 11 31-39; PACE Res. 1418,
supra note 130, 1 6, 8.
132. See Page, supra note 129.
133. PACE Res. 1418, supra note 130, 1 7.
134. See Editorial, Rule of Law Takes a Hit, BOSTON HERALD, June 3, 2005, at 26.
135. Political Persecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Weekly Highlights on Russia
Focusing on Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Leadership of Group MENATEP, Oct. 13,
2005, http://www.supportmbk.com/update/101 3_2005_briefing.cfm (last visited Oct.
4, 2006).
136. See Liz Chang, Kremlin Extradition Request Turned Down, TIMES (UK), Mar. 19,
2005, at 15. See generally BritishJudge Rejects Russian Yukos Bid, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
18, 2005; Jeremy Lorell, UK Rejects Extradition of Former Yukos Executive, EPOCH TIMES,
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There is wide support for the presumption that the involvement of Khodorkovsky in Russian politics, particularly in connection with the approaching parliamentary and presidential elections, was a direct reason for his arrest and prosecution. 1 7 In
addition, while eliminating Khodorkovsky as a political opponent, the Russian authorities were able to eliminate Yukos as a
competitor to State-owned energy companies. The PACE Resolution states:
[T] he circumstances of the arrest and prosecution of leading
Yukos executives suggest that the interest of the State's action
in these cases goes beyond the mere pursuit of criminal justice, and includes elements such as the weakening of an outspoken political opponent, the intimidation of other wealthy
individuals and the regaining of control of strategic economic
assets. 138

PACE referred to the ruling of the European Court of Human
Rights in Gusinskiy v. Russia, in which the Court decided that the
detention of Gusinskiy by the Russian authorities was in violation
of Article 5 in conjunction with Article 18 of the ECHR, since
this restriction of freedom was not only intended to be brought
"before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion
of having committed an offence," but was also applied for an
unlawful purpose, namely to coerce the sale of Gusinskiy's shares
of NTV to Gazprom, the State-owned gas monopoly. 139 Ultimately, the elimination of Khodorkovsky as a political opponent
and as the corporate head of Yukos, and the eventual confiscation of Yukos itself, were politically engineered, and had little to
Dec. 23, 2005, http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-12-23/36130.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2006).
137. Russian Federation v. Maruev, (2005) (Bow Street Magistrates' Court) Senior

DistrictJudge Timothy Workman and the reports of several reputable experts who have
appeared as expert witnesses for the Bow Street Magistrates' Court: Professor William
Bowring, datedJan. 14, 2005, among others 15, Evgeny Kiselev, dated Feb. 9, 2005,
17-20, Professor Richard Sakwa, dated Jan. 10, 2005; see also Letter from Seven Former
Heads of State and Government, All Members of the Club of Madrid to President Putin
(Nov. 2005); Anna Neistat, Russia: Yukos Trial Begins Amid Rights Rollback, Human Rights
Watch, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/16/russia8852.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2006); US. Policy Toward Russia, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations).
138. PACE Res. 1418, supra note 130,
1-14.
139. Gusinskiy v. Russ., App. No. 70276/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), availableat http:/
/www.echr.coe.int/.
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140

do with law.
The political interference affecting Khodorkovsky's fundamental human rights and fair trial rights was also recognized in
the judgment of Senior District Judge Timothy Workman of the
Bow Street Magistrates' Court in Great Britain. This judgment
was rendered in the extradition case against two co-accused
associates of Khodorkovsky, Dmitry Maruev and Natalya Chernysheva. In this judgment, Judge Workman observed that "President Putin directed that Miss Chernysheva and Mr. Khodorkovsky should be prosecuted;" "Mr Khodorkovsky was seen as a
powerful political opponent of Mr. Putin;" and "it is more likely
than not that the Prosecution of Mr. Khodorkovsky is politically
motivated." 4 ' Furthermore, the judgment considered that "a
fair trial of these two defendants is likely to be prejudiced by
their political opinions and the opinions of those associated with
them."' 4 2 These observations were reinforced in the later ruling
of December 23, 2005, in the case Russian Federation v. Temerko,
also heard before the Bow Street Magistrates' Court. 1 43 The British judge again refused to comply with a Russian request for extradition, this time regarding Mr. Alexander V. Temerko, the
second-in-command under Khodorkovsky, because the motivation for the criminal proceedings against him was political.' 4 4
Requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters issued by
Russia to other States in relation to politically-motivated prosecutions, such as those of Khodorkovsky and his co-accuseds, may be
characterized as an expression of the Prerogative State defined
by Fraenkel. 1 45 Accordingly, the horizontal model of State cooperation within the system of inter-State cooperation in criminal
matters is exposed to the same risks as the vertical model of State
cooperation, including the risk of being influenced by political
motives controlled by States and unchecked by law. States that
lend judicial support in politically-motivated criminal matters
may find themselves responsible for violations of fundamental
human rights set forth in the ECHR.
140. See generally Rule of Law Takes a Hit, supra note 134.
141. See BritishJudge Rejects Russian Yukos Bid, supra note 136.
142. Id.
143. See Lorell, supra note 136.
144. Bob Sherwood, Judge Refuses to Extradite Former Oil Chief, FIN. TIMES (UK),
Dec. 24, 2005, at 2.
145. See FRAENKEL, supra note 6, at 3-56.
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3. State Responsibility of the Requested State
Seen from a perspective of State responsibility of the requested State with respect to a request for mutual assistance in
criminal matters, Yukos is again relevant. The judgments rendered by the Swiss Supreme Court on January 9, 2006, may be
seen as an exponent of the imposition of State responsibility of
the requested State to prevent the Prerogative (requesting) State
from exercising powers arbitrarily and unchecked by law. 14 6 Russia filed a request for mutual assistance in criminal matters regarding Yukos, the legitimacy of which was considered by the
Swiss court. 4 7
On January 9, 2006, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland ("Swiss Supreme Court") rendered decisions in three cases
for which appeals were lodged against the rendering of legal assistance in response to requests from Russia. 1 48 In these cases
the Russian Embassy in Bern had guaranteed that Russia would
respect the ECHR. However, the Swiss Court took the position
that "it is possible to question the usefulness" of such guarantees
"since the hearings had already ended at the time, and since the
judgment of the lower court had been rendered. The affirmations of the requesting authority [the Russian Federation] with
regard to respect for rights guaranteed, in particular, by the
14 9
ECHR, can be considered only with circumspection."
This reasoning of the Swiss Supreme Court may have a
more general impact in its acknowledgement that the mere fact
that Russia guarantees to respect the ECHR does not ensure that
the requesting State will not act unlawfully by rendering the requested assistance. The element of State responsibility for the
requested State is evident in the ruling of the Swiss Court where
it states that "[a] II these special circumstances require the Swiss
authority to depart, exceptionally, from its usual reserve in the
of facts that is submitted to it by
examination of the Statement
15 0
authority.
the requesting
146. See
ATF, at 3.2.
Switz.).
147. See
Russia, Russ.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.

N v. Ministre Public de la Conf6d6ration, Case No. 1A.216/2005/col,
(Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.bger.ch/fr/ (Federal Court of
generally Switzerland Refuses to Hand Documents Under "Yukos Affair" Over to
OIL & GAs REP., Feb. 8, 2006.
§ 4.2.
§ 3.2.
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The Yukos case exemplifies that indeed the phenomenon of
the Dual State portrayed by Fraenkel may exist within the horizontal model of State cooperation, particularly in connection
with State requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters. Although international judicial cooperation conventions are premised on the assumption that each State will comply with the
rule of law and fundamental norms of human rights, requests
for mutual assistance in criminal cases instigated by a Prerogative
State should be scrutinized both on the basis of an extensive interpretation of the abuse of process and the abuse of power doctrines, and with consideration of State responsibility for the requested States.
XI. CONCLUSIONS: DUALITY AND EQUALITY OF ARMS
JUXTAPOSING STATE COOPERATION
In this Article, the fundamental importance of State cooperation has been analyzed for both international and internationalized (mixed) criminal tribunals. From the perspective of
maintaining international criminal justice, it was established that
the vertical model of State cooperation is probably the most effective approach. Contrary to inter-State cooperation in judicial
matters, it is this model that is predominantly applied by international criminal tribunals.
However, the downside is that the prosecution de facto benefits more than the defense as a result of the imbalance of financial resources and political powers. Consequently, State cooperation in international criminal cases cannot be invoked on the
basis of procedural equity. Notwithstanding the observation that
in the 1999 Tadic case, the ICTY Appeal Chamber judges strove
for an extensive application of equality of arms also in relation to
State cooperation in favor of the defense, such an extensive application is not effectuated in the practice of international and
internationalized criminal tribunals.
It may further be observed that State cooperation is also easily subject to influences of a legal-political nature in the sense
that States are still endowed with considerable discretionary powers to refrain from granting State cooperation depending upon
whether the request concerns the prosecution or the defense.
The normative system that has been developed by the international criminal tribunals regarding State cooperation is to a large
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extent open to legal-political discretion and in this sense does
not differ from the political influences to which the horizontal
and traditional model of inter-State cooperation in criminal matters is subject. An exponent of the latter is illustrated by Russia's
requests to various European States for mutual assistance in
criminal matters alleged in the Yukos case.
Applied in this way, State cooperation simply shields the
doctrine of State sovereignty. The perniciousness of the Dual
State, wherein the abuses of the Prerogative State are masked by
the order and progress of the Normative State, is thereby reinforced. State cooperation becomes an instrument of the Dual
State, potentially endangering bedrock principles of justice, including the principle of equality of arms. The risks attendant to
this phenomenon are clear. The goals of international criminal
justice may be thwarted as long as State cooperation is subject to
manipulations driven by the prerogative of a Dual State.

